


CS 419: Computer Security

Week 6: Part 2  
POSIX Permissions



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

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# File permissions

- Access isn't all or nothing
- Objects can have different access permissions

## UNIX (POSIX) permission model

- Access permissions: read (r), write (w), execute (x)
  - All independently set
- Each file has an owner



# Example: Limited ACLs in POSIX systems

- **Problem: ACLs takes up a varying amount of space**
  - They won't fit in a fixed-size inode
- **UNIX Compromise:**
  - A file defines access rights for three domains: the **owner**, the **group**, and **everyone else**
  - **Permissions**
    - Read, write, execute (for files), search (for directories)
    - Set user ID: execute with user permissions of the file's owner
    - Set group ID: execute with the group permissions of the file's group
  - Default permissions set by the **umask** system call
  - **chown** system call changes the object's owner
  - **chgrp** system call changes the object's group
  - **chmod** system call changes the object's permissions

# How do you share files?

- **Groups & everyone else (other)**
- **A user has one user ID but may belong to multiple groups**
  - One current default group ID for new objects
  - Multiple groups
- **Other = all others (users who are not the owner or group members)**
- **File access permissions are expressed as:**

`rwXrwxrwx`  
└──┬──┬──┘  
user group other

```
$ ls -l /bin/ls  
-rwxr-xr-x 1 root root 138216 Feb 7 2024 /bin/ls
```

# Permission checking

if you are the owner of the file  
only owner permissions apply

if you are part of a group the file belongs to  
only group permissions apply

else “other” permissions apply

I cannot read this file even if I'm in the *localaccounts* group:

```
$ ls -l testfile
----rw---- 1 paul localaccounts 6 Jan 30 10:37 testfile
```

# Execute permission

- **Distinct from read**
- **You may have `execute-only` access**
  - This takes away your right to copy the file  
... or inspect it
  - But the OS can load it & run it

# Windows

- **Windows has users & groups but more permissions**
  - Read, write, execute
  - Also: delete, change permission, change ownership
- **Users & resources can be partitioned into groups & domains**
  - Each *domain* can have its own administrator
    - HR can manage users
    - Individual departments can manage printers
- **Trust can be inherited in one or both directions**
  - *department resources* domains may trust the *user* domain
  - *user* domain may not trust *department resources* domains

# What about directories?

- **Directories are just files that map `names` to `inode numbers`**
- **Permissions have special meaning**
  - `Write` = permission to create a file in the directory
  - `Read` = permission to list the contents of a directory
  - `Execute` = permission to search through the directory
- **If you have `write` access to the directory of a file, you can `delete` the file**
  - Even if you don't have write access to the file itself
- **If you don't have `write` access to the directory**
  - You cannot *create* or *delete* a file ... even if you have *write* access to it



# Changing permissions

## The **chmod** command

user = read, write, execute  
group = read, execute  
other = -none-

- Set permissions

```
$ chmod u=rwx,g=rx,o= testfile
```

```
$ ls -l testfile
```

```
-rwxr-x--- 1 paul localaccounts 6 Jan 30 10:37 testfile
```

- Add permissions

```
$ chmod go+w testfile
```

```
$ ls -l testfile
```

```
-rwxrwx-w- 1 paul localaccounts 6 Jan 30 10:37 testfile
```

- Remove permissions

```
$ chmod o-w testfile
```

```
$ ls -l testfile
```

```
-r-xrwx--- 1 paul localaccounts 6 Jan 30 10:37 testfile
```

# Changing permissions

Or the old-fashioned way – specify an octal bitmask

- Set permissions


```
$ chmod 754 testfile
```

```
$ ls -l testfile
```

```
-rwxr-xr-- 1 paul localaccounts 6 Jan 30 10:37 testfile
```

7	5	4
111	101	100
rwx	r-x	r--
user	group	other

# File permissions are stored in the file's inode



# Sometimes groups aren't enough

## Access Control Lists (ACL)

- **Explicit list of permissions for users**
- **Supported by most operating systems**
  - Windows  $\geq$  XP
  - macOS  $\geq$  10.4
  - Linux  $\geq$  ext3 file system + acl package

# Example: Full ACLs in POSIX systems

*What if we want to use a full ACL?*

- **Extended attributes:** stored outside of the inode
  - Hold an ACL
  - And other name:value attributes
- **Enumerated list of permissions on users and groups**
  - Operations on all objects:
    - *delete, readattr, writeattr, readextattr, writeextattr, readsecurity, writesecurity, chown*
  - Operations on directories
    - *list, search, add\_file, add\_subdirectory, delete\_child*
  - Operations on files
    - *read, write, append, execute*
  - Inheritance controls

# ACLs and ACEs

**Access Control List (ACL) = list of Access Control Entries (ACE)**

- **ACE identifies a user or group & permissions**
  - Files: read, write, execute, append
  - Directories:  
list, search, read attributes, add file, add sub-directory, delete contents
- **“*Inheritance*” permission**
  - Files and directories can inherit ACL entries from the parent
- **Wildcards are often supported**
- **See *chmod* on macOS or *setfacl* on Linux**

# Example ACL

`pxk.*`            `rwX`

`419-ta.*`        `rwX`

`*.faculty`      `rx`

`*.*`             `x`

- Users `pxk` and `419-ta` have *read-write-execute* access
- Users in the `faculty` group have *read-execute* access
- Others only have *execute* access

# Search order

ACEs are evaluated in the order they are entered into the ACL

In this case, I don't have write access to the file:

419-ta.*	rwX		
*.faculty	rx	← This is me	← This appears first & has priority
pxk.*	rwX	← So is this	
*.*	X	← So is this	



# Search order: ACLs + permissions

In systems like Linux that integrate ACLs with 9-bit permissions:

1. If you are the owner of the file, *only* owner permissions apply
2. If you are part of a group the file belongs to, only group permissions apply
3. Else search through the ACL entries to find an applicable entry
4. Else other permissions apply

# macOS Examples

# macOS ACL examples (1)

- **Create a file**

```
$ echo hello > hi.txt
```

```
$ cat hi.txt
```

```
hello
```

- **List the file**

- Show ACEs with -e option to ls

```
$ ls -l hi.txt
```

```
-rw-r--r--  1 paul  wheel  6 Sep 13 23:01 hi.txt
```

```
$ ls -le hi.txt
```

```
-rw-r--r--  1 paul  wheel  6 Sep 13 23:01 hi.txt
```

**No ACL!**

# macOS ACL examples (2)

- **Take away read & write access**

- Add an access control entry with `chmod +a`
  - Remove an access control entry with `chmod -a`
- ```
$ chmod +a "paul deny read,write" hi.txt
```

- **See what we have**

```
$ ls -le hi.txt
-rw-r--r--+ 1 paul  wheel  6 Sep 13 23:01 hi.txt
0: user:paul deny read,write
```



ACL

- **Add append access**

```
$ chmod +a "paul allow append" hi.txt
$ ls -le hi.txt
-rw-r--r--+ 1 paul  wheel  6 Sep 13 23:01 hi.txt
0: user:paul deny read,write
1: user:paul allow append
```



ACL

# macOS ACL examples (3)

- Try reading and writing to the file

```
$ echo "new data" >hi.txt
bash: hi.txt: Permission denied
$ cat hi.txt
cat: hi.txt: Permission denied
```

- But we can append

```
$ echo "appended data" >>hi.txt
$ ls -l hi.txt
-rw-r--r--+ 1 paul  wheel  20 Sep 13 23:16 hi.txt
```

- Useful for granting users append-only access to a log file

It's bigger: 20 bytes vs. 6

# macOS ACL examples (4)

- Remove Access Control Entry #0

```
$ ls -le hi.txt
```

```
-rw-r--r--+ 1 paul  wheel  20 Sep 13 23:16 hi.txt
```

```
0: user:paul deny read,write
```

```
1: user:paul allow append
```

```
$ chmod -a# 0 hi.txt
```

chmod -a# N removes rule N

```
$ ls -le hi.txt
```

```
-rw-r--r--+ 1 paul  wheel  20 Sep 13 23:16 hi.txt
```

```
0: user:paul allow append
```

The “deny read, write” entry is gone

- Now we can see the file

```
$ cat hi.txt
```

```
hello
```

```
appended data
```

# Changing Permissions

# Initial file permissions

On Unix-derived systems (Linux, macOS, Android, \*BSD):

- **umask** = set of permissions applications cannot set on files
  - Bitmask (octal) of bits that will be **turned off**
- To disallow *read-write-execute* for everyone but the owner
  - `umask = 000 111 111 = 077`
- Default **umask** on macOS & Ubuntu is **022**
  - `022 = 000 010 010 = --- -w- -w-`
  - This takes away *write* access from group & other
  - By default, new files are readable by all and writable only by the owner

See the *umask* command and *umask* system call man pages



# Watch out for race conditions!

Suppose we create a file readable by all: `rwxr--r--`

`rwX, r, r`

- And then we change the permissions to `rwX-----`

`rwX, -, -`

```
#!/bin/bash
myapp >secretfile
chmod go-r secretfile
```

## GOOD

Create a file: `rwX-r--r-`  
Change permissions to `rwX-----`  
*[Attacker opens the file for reading]*  
Do your work

## BAD

Create a file: `rwX-r--r-`  
*[Attacker opens the file for reading]*  
Change permissions to `rwX-----`  
Do your work

- We don't know when the attacker will hit
- Once the attacker has the file open, changing permissions does not take access away
  - Access rights are only checked when the file is opened!

# Giving files away

- You can change the owner of a file

```
chown alice testfile
```

- Changes the file's owner to alice

- You can change the group of a file too

```
chgrp accounting testfile
```

- Changes the file's group to accounting

... but you have to be the owner to do either

# Changing user & group IDs

- **root = uid 0 = super user**
  - Access to everything
- **How do you log in?**
  - login program runs as uid=0
  - Gets your credentials
  - Authenticates you
  - Then:

```
chdir(home_directory);  
setgid(group_id);  
setuid(user_id);  
execve(user_shell, ...);
```

# Changing user ID temporarily

- **What if some files need special access?**
  - A print program needs to access the printer queue
  - A database needs to access its underlying files
- **An executable file normally runs under the user's ID**
- **A special permission bit, the “**setuid bit**” changes this**
  - **Executable files** with the setuid bit will run with the *effective UID* set to the owner of the file
  - **Directories** with the setuid bit set will force all files and sub-directories created in them to be owned by the directory owner
- **Same thing with groups – the **setgid** permission bit**
  - Executable files with this bit set will run with effective gid set to the gid of the file.

# Principle of Least Privilege

At each abstraction layer, every element (user, process, function) should be able to access **only** the resources necessary to perform its task

**Even if an element is compromised, the scope of damage is limited**

**Consider:**

- **Good:** You cannot kill another user's process
- **Good:** You cannot open the `/etc/hosts` file for writing
- **Good:** Private member functions & local variables in functions limit scope
  
- **Violation:** a compromised print daemon allows someone to add users
- **Violation:** a process can write a file even though there is no need to
- **Violation:** admin privileges set by default for any user account


**Least privilege is often difficult to define & enforce**

# Privilege Separation

## Divide a program into multiple parts: high & low privilege components

### Example on POSIX systems

- Each process has a *real* and *effective* user ID
- Privileges are evaluated based on the effective user ID
  - Normally, `uid == euid`
- An executable file may be tagged with a *setuid bit*
  - `chmod +sx filename`
  - When run: `uid = user's ID`  
`euid = file owner's ID (without setuid, runs with user's ID)`
- Separating a program
  1. Run a *setuid* program
  2. Create a communication link to self (*pipe*, *socket*, shared memory)
  3. *fork*
  4. One of the processes will call `seteuid(getuid())` to lower its privilege



# Setuid can get you into trouble!

- Most *setuid* programs ran as root
- If they were compromised, the whole system was compromised
- This was one of the best attack vectors for Unix/Linux systems

# The End